Abstract. Lattice-based signature schemes constitute an interesting alternative to RSA and discrete logarithm based systems which may become insecure in the future, for example due to the possibility of quantum attacks. A particularly interesting scheme in this context is the GPV signature scheme [GPV08] combined with the trapdoor construction from Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] as it admits strong security proofs and is believed to be very efficient in practice. This paper confirms this belief and shows how to improve the GPV scheme in terms of space and running time and presents an implementation of the optimized scheme. A ring variant of this scheme is also introduced which leads to a more efficient construction. Experimental results show that GPV with the new trapdoor construction is competitive to the signature schemes that are currently used in practice.
Introduction

Our Contribution
In this paper we give the first software implementation of the GPV signature [GPV08] scheme using the newest trapdoor construction from Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] . Moreover, we present an efficient ring variant of the scheme based on the ring-LWE problem. In addition, we propose improvements that lower the memory claims for the perturbation matrix by a factor of about 240 compared to the proposal in [MP12] . When generating signatures the perturbation matrix is required to sample integer vectors with a given covariance. In both variants the matrix and ring variant we considerably improved the running times of key and signature generation. For instance, the running times of key and signature generation are lowered by a factor of 30-190 respectively 2-6 in the ring variant. By providing running times, storage sizes and security levels for different parameter sets we show that the ring variant has a 3-6 times faster signature generation engine compared to the matrix variant. At the same time verification is about 3-9 times faster. Thus, we show that the proposed constructions are quite efficient and hence competitive regarding the performance.
Related Work
The construction of lattice based signature schemes appeared to be a big challenge up to the last couples of years. This is due to the absence of practical constructions enjoying provable security. First constructions, however, such as GGH [GGH97] and NTRU Sign [HPS98] were completely broken. This fundamentally changed in 2008 by introducing the GPV signature scheme by Gentry et al. [GPV08] and the one time signature LM-OTS by Micciancio and Lyubashevsky [LM08] . The latter one operates in ideal lattices which allows for faster computations and smaller key sizes while providing provable security. When using Merkle Trees one can transform LM-OTS into a full signature scheme. The subsequent works [Lyu08, Lyu09] build upon the one time signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] . Recently, Lyubashevsky proposed an efficient construction [Lyu12] that performs very well on hardware [GLP12] . The hash-and-sign approach in turn was reconsidered in [GPV08] leading to constructions that admit security based on the hardness of the SIS Problem. Specifically, they aim at building a uniform random matrix A ∈ Z n×m endowed with a trapdoor S ∈ Z m×m in such a way that S has small entries and A · S ≡ 0 mod q holds. By means of the secret matrix S a signer can produce short preimages x for the hash value H(mess) of a message mess to be signed such that Ax ≡ H(mess). The quality of the secret matrix immediately transfers to the quality of the signatures and hence plays a major role for assessing the security. Therefore, improving the algorithms for key generation is an ongoing research objective. Such constructions were considered for the first time in [Ajt99] and later on improved by [AP09, Pei10] , but unfortunately they are inefficient and thus not suitable for practice. This is because the involved algorithms are complex and expensive in terms of space and runtime. However, Micciancio and Peikert recently proposed in [MP12] an elegant trapdoor construction which allows for fast signature generation while providing an improved output quality.
Organization
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 3 we introduce the GPV signature scheme together with the most recent trapdoor construction [MP12] . Furthermore, we provide a ring variant for this construction in Section 3.2. Section 4 contains a detailed description of our implementation and optimizations. In Section 5 we present the experimental results and their analysis.
Preliminaries
Notation
We will use the polynomial rings R = Z[x]/ f (x) and R q = Z q [x]/ f (x) for a polynomial f (x) that is monic and irreducible over Z. For the ring-LWE problem we consider the cyclotomic polynomials, such as f (x) = x n + 1 for n being a power of 2. The m-th cyclotomic polynomial with integer coefficients is the polynomial of degree n = φ(m) whose roots are the primitive m-th roots of unity.
We denote ring elements by boldface lower case letters e.g. p, whereas for vectors of ring elements we usep. For a vector v ∈ R n , a positive real s, and a lattice Λ ⊂ R n , let D Λ,v,s denote the n-dimensional discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ, centered at v, with parameter s. For x ∈ Λ, the distribution D Λ,v,s assigns the probability Definition 1. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and positive real > 0, the smoothing parameter η (Λ) is the smallest real s > 0 such that ρ 1/s (Λ * \{0}) ≤
The matrixB stands for the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalized basis of the basis matrix B. And S denotes the matrix norm. By [A|B] we define the matrix obtained by the concatenation of the matrices A and B.
Trapdoor Signatures
The signature scheme due to Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08] consists mainly of sampling a preimage from a hash function featured with a trapdoor. The security of this construction is based on the hardness of 2 -SIS. In [MP12] Micciancio and Peikert provide a new trapdoor notion that improved all relevant bounds of the previous proposals [Ajt99, AP09] .
Description of the matrix version [GPV08,MP12]
Similar to the constructions of [Ajt99, AP09] , the authors of [MP12] start with a uniform random matrixĀ ∈ Z n×m and extend it to a matrix A = [Ā|G −ĀR] ∈ Z n×m via deterministic transformations. The main idea behind this proposal is to use a primitive matrix G ∈ Z n×ω , which has the property of generating Z n q and for which one can easily sample preimages. Due to the nice structure of this matrix one can find a basis S ∈ Z ω×ω satisfying the congruence relation G · S ≡ 0 mod q. Starting from the primitive vector g T := (1, 2, 4, . . . , 2 k−1 ) ∈ Z k q with k = log 2 q one can find an associated basis S k for the lattice Λ ⊥ q (g T ) which is defined by
By means of the vector g T and the associated basis S k one can easily create S ∈ Z nk×nk q and the parity check matrix G ∈ Z n×nk q , respectively:
For the sake of simplicity we fix the parameter q to be 2 k according to [MP12] for some k ∈ N. An optimal bound for the smoothing parameter of the lattice
easily be obtained using the orthogonolized basisS k = 2 · I k . Since S = S k = 2, In what follows we describe the preimage sampling algorithm for a syndrome t ∈ Z q from the coset Λ ⊥ t (g ) = {x | g · x ≡ t mod q} using the randomized nearest plane algorithm. Due to the nice properties of the orthogonalized basis, the algorithm reduces to a few steps with a 0 = t :
. Of course, similarly one can sample preimages from Λ ⊥ u (G) for a syndrom vector u ∈ Z n q by independently running n instances of the algortihm on each component of u. The authors provide two different types of instantiations for the trapdoor generation algorithm, namely the statistical and computational instantiation. Regarding the GPV signature scheme we used the latter one in our implementation because the dimension of A is much smaller. Therefore, we will always refer to the computational instantiation in the rest of this work. Such a representation can easily be achieved by generating a uniform random matrixÃ ∈ Z n×n and sampling a trapdoor R =
R1
R2 from the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z 2n×nk ,αq where α ∈ R >0 satisfies αq > √ n. The resulting matrix [Ā|G − (ÃR 2 + R 1 )] withĀ = [I n |Ã] is an instance of decision-LW E n,α,q and hence pseudorandom when ignoring the identity submatrix. Applying the framework of [GPV08] requires to sample a spherically distributed preimage for a given syndrome u ∈ Z n q using Gaussian sampling algorithms and the trapdoor R. In fact, the spherical distribution is a common tool to make the distribution of the signature independent from the secret key. The Gaussian sampling algorithm mainly consists of two parts. The first part involves the trapdoor R which is used to transform a sample x from the set Λ and hence leaks information about the trapdoor. An attacker could collect samples and reconstruct the covariance matrix. Therefore, we need the second part to correct this flaw. This can be done by adding perturbations from a properly chosen distribution. Using the convolution technique from [Pei10] , we can choose a parameter s in such a way that s 2 is slightly larger than the largest absolute eigenvalue of the covariance COV and generate Gaussian pertubations p ∈ Z m having covariance Σ p = s 2 I − COV. In order to obtain a vector b that is from a spherical Gaussian distribution with parameter s, one samples a preimage y for an adjusted syndrome a = u − Ap from Λ ⊥ a (A). The vector b = p + y provides a spherical distributed sample satisfying Ab ≡ u mod q. The following algorithms provide the main functionality for the GPV signature scheme: 
When applying the framework of [RS10] we get Table 1 which contains different parameter sets with their corresponding estimated sublattice attack dimension d and the more relevant estimated security level δ. The SIS norm bound is denoted by ν. Columns marked with provide according to [GPV08, Proposition 5 .7] additional worst-case to average-case hardness satisfying q ≥ ν · ω( n log 2 (n)). The parameters of the scheme should be set in such a way that δ ≤ 1.007 in order to ensure about 100 bits of security [RS10] . Concrete parameter choices for this scheme can be found in the appendix (Table 3) . Table 1 . Parameter sets with the corresponding estimated sublattice attack dimensions d and security levels δ according to [RS10] .
The Ring Setting
In [MP12] the authors state that the construction can be adapted to the ring setting in such a way that the elements of the primitive vector g are considered as ring elements of R q = Z q [X]/φ m (X) rather than Z q , where φ m (X) is the m-th cyclotomic polynomial. In the following section we present our construction of this idea.
Construction 1
The public key is generated by drawing k samples (ā i ,ā i r i + e i ) from the ring-LWE distribution. By this, we obtain a public key that is pseudorandom and enjoys the hardness of ring-LWE. Following [Lyu11] one can use the error distribution in order to sample the trapdoor polynomialsr ∈ R k q andê ∈ R k q . This does not incur any security flaws. Indeed, this property is essential for the signature scheme to work due to the need for smaller secret keys. As in the matrix variant one can use only one uniformly distributed sampleā 1 rather than a set in A. By a standard hybrid argument the hardness of distinguishingā 1 r i + e i from uniformly distributed samples can be reduced to decision ring-LWE [BPR12] . Thus, we obtain a public key of the following shape:
Similar to the matrix versionĝ = [1, · · · , 2 k−1 ] defines the primitive vector of polynomials where each component is considered as a constant polynomial.
j is the i-th coefficient of the j-th polynomial. The resulting vector y is from a spherical Gaussian distribution having covariance matrix r 2 I. Sampling a preimage for a syndrome u ∈ R q requires to sample polynomialsx = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) from Λ ⊥ u (ĝ ). These are then used to construct the preimageẑ = [
. It can easily be verified, that Aẑ ≡ u holds. With the same arguments as in the matrix case we need to add some perturbation to transform the skewed distribution into a spherical one. Since we mainly operate on rings modulo x n + 1 with n a power of two, multiplication of polynomials r i x i correspond to matrix multiplication Rot(r i )x i . The matrix Rot(r i ) consists of n columns [r i , rot(r i ), · · · , rot n−1 (r i )] with rot(y) = [−y n−1 , y 0 , . . . , y n−2 ] defining the rotation in anti-cyclic integer lattices. Of course, other irreducible polynomials are also possible, but have the drawback of larger expansion factors which imply increased preimage lengths. The covariance matrix of the preimage has the following shape:
One observes, that the computation of this matrix is very simple since matrix multiplication corresponds to polynomial multiplication with β(x) = [x 1 , −x n , −x n−1 , . . . , −x 2 ] which is the first row of Rot(x):
Now one can use the techniques from the previous section in order to generate perturbations. A perturbation vector p ∈ Z n(k+2) is then split into k + 2 parts of length n. Each part corresponds to a perturbation polynomial p i ∈ R q . In order to provide a preimage for a syndrome polynomial u one samples perturbations p 1 , . . . , p k+2 ∈ R q as shown before. Then we create sample polynomialsx from Λ ⊥ u−Ap (ĝ ). The resulting preimageẑ is then spherically distributed:
Now we give a short description of how to instantiate the Ring-LWE problem and how to sample the secret keys r i and e i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k according to [DD12] . The authors provide different from the work [LPR10] a relatively simple Ring-LWE setting avoiding the work in the dual Ring R ∨ q or the H-Space [LPR10] which turns out to be more convenient in certain applications. Following the paper of [BLP + 13,LS12] we can take q to be a power of two as in the matrix variant. Such choices are more suitable for practice since the nice sampling algorithms introduced in the previous section are applicable. A prime number would involve costly sampling procedures which lead to a slower signature generation engine. As stated in [Lyu11] it is possible to generate both the secret key r i and e i from the same error distribution without affecting the security. Indeed, this property is important in order to make the trapdoor construction work based on the Ring-LWE assumption. Specifically, we need small keys to provide short preimages. If one operates in the ring Z q [X]/(X n + 1) with n a power of two, the coefficients of both r i and e i are chosen from the Gaussian distribution on the rationals and then rounded to the nearest integers. In particular, the polynomials r i and e i are distributed as
where l is the number of samples and αq > ω( √ log 2n). In practical applications one can omit the last term [DD12] or set l = 1 due to the fact that a possible adversary can always create own samples by usingā 1 . For other choice of cyclotomic polynomials Φ m it is required to sample the trapdoor polynomials in extension Rings according to [DD12, Theorem 2].
Construction 2 We briefly explain another ring construction that is derived from [Mic07] . Take k = log 2 q andm = O(log 2 (n)). Then selectm uniformly random polynomialŝ
Furthermore choose k vectorsr i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, each consisting ofm random polynomials r i1 , . . . , r im of degree n − 1 with small coefficients. By [SSTX09, Lemma 6], which is an adapted variant of the regularity lemma of [Mic07] , the function values am +i = h a (r i ) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k are essentially uniformly distributed and independent from the random polynomials a i . Thus, we can create an almost uniformly random vector of polynomials A endowed with the trapdoorr i ∈ Rm q where 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
To generate a preimage of a given syndrom polynomial u ∈ R q , one has to sample a vectorx ∈ Λ ⊥ u (ĝ ) using the methods from above. As one can easily verify, the vector y = [r 1 x 1 , . . . ,r k x k , x 1 , . . . , x k ] is a preimage of the syndrome u for A. Using the techniques from the descriptions before, one can produce spherically distributed samples.
Improvements and Implementation Details
In our implementation we have to face several challenges that affect the performance of the signature scheme both in the matrix and ring variant. In the following sections we give a detailed description of our improvements and implementation results.
Computation of the Covariance matrix
Firstly, we observed that the computation of the covariance matrix COV is too expensive in terms of running time. Since the basis matrix COV is sparse, we were able to significantly reduce the computational efforts. It can be split into four parts as below. The only block to be computed is the symmetric matrix RR T .
In the ring variant the computation of the covariance matrix is much faster because multiplication is performed in polynomial rings as explained in the description. Running these parts in parallel offers another source of optimization.
Power Iteration Algorithm
We also made the observation that a large parameter s affects the computational efforts and the preimage length. Therefore, we used the power iteration algorithm to approximate the largest absolute eigenvalue to arbitrary precision. It is a very simple algorithm that does not compute a matrix decomposition, hence it can be used when the covariance matrix is a very large sparse matrix. This algorithm is performed once in the key generation step. Define the initial vector u 0 = (1, . . . , 1) T and perform the following steps in an iterative manner:
Due to the sparsity of the matrix COV the number of operations can significantly be reduced. After some iterations we get a good approximationμ for the largest absolute eigenvalue µ. In order for Σ p = s 2 I − COV to be positive definite, s 2 must be larger than the largest absolute eigenvalue. For instance, we can choose s = 1.1 · √μ .
Generation of Perturbation Vectors
One of the main ingredients of the signature scheme is the idea of creating perturbations [MP12] in order to get spherically distributed preimages that do not carry any information about the secret key. A perturbation vector is generated by means of the distribution D to a nearby integer using the discrete Gaussian distribution. The generation of perturbation vectors requires the square root computation Σ p − a 2 I. Below we discuss one method for this purpose and provide improvements through a better analysis.
Square Root Computation
The Cholesky decomposition splits any positive definite matrix M into the product of a lower triangular matrix and its conjugate transpose, i.e. M = L · L T , and runs in time O(m 3 ) = O((k + 2) 3 n 3 ). If one selects k = 19, then the constant factor grows by 9261, which is very high compared to n = 256. The Cholesky decomposition is needed to generate perturbations that have covariance matrix Σ p , where Σ p is the Cholesky matrix. An algorithm for the Cholesky decomposition is shown in the appendix A.2 (Algorithm 1). When decomposing the matrix Σ p − a 2 I into its roots, one can improve the running time by our modified Cholesky decomposition (variant 1) taking into account the n 2 k 2 − n · k zero entries. Although this optimization (variant 1) noticeably improves the timings of key generation, the algorithm is still inefficient and is the main source of slow key generation. Moreover, the resulting perturbation matrix is dense and has no structure, which leads high memory claims in order to store the matrix of floating entries and to worse signature generation running times. This is due to the fact that each generation of a perturbation vector requires to multiply a huge triangular matrix consisting of multi-precision floating point entries with a floating point vector. To circumvent this problem we made a modification to the original matrix by left multiplication of the permutation matrix
to the public key A. It is obvious that this transformation does not cause any security flaws because it is a simple reordering. The advantage of such a reordering is that one obtains a perturbation covariance matrix Σ p with a nice structure which enables us to work with Schur complements [Zha10] in a very efficient way:
Therefore we get an algorithm which outperforms the optimized cholesky decomposition applied on the non-permuted matrix A by a factor of 30-190. Furthermore, we obtain a signature generation engine which yields a factor improvement of 2-6 in the ring variant. This is due to the sparse matrix and its nice structure. In both the key and signature generation steps the factor grows as n increases. In general the Schur complement is defined as follows: This decomposition is successively applied on the submatrices S i ∈ R m−i×m−i . Doing this, one obtains an efficient method to construct the columns of the matrix Σ p − a 2 I.
The first nk colums
2 involve only a simple scaling operation. Therefore, we need no additional memory in order to store these columns. Due to the sparse columns multiplication involves only the non-zero columns (R) i of the matrix R = R1 R2 . Thus, transformations are focused only on the (2n × 2n) matrix:
The last sum of vector products reduces to the simple scaling operation 1 b RR . Thus, one can save the costly vector product computations. When continuing the decomposition on the remaining matrix S nk one obtains the Cholesky decomposition. One can easily verify that
holds. Consequently one needs only to store n(2n+1) floating point entries of the last part L = Decomp(S nk ) instead of m(m + 1)/2 in the case without permutation. For instance, this induces an improvement factor of m(m + 1)/2n(2n + 1) ≈ 240 for n = 512 and k = 29. A nice sideeffect of this transformation is a much faster algorithm for generating perturbations since the number of operations drastically decreases as the factor grows.
In the matrix version, one makes use of the sparse decomposition matrix. In particular 
Thus, we get a fast signature generation algorithm which is about three times faster than its matrix analogue. It is also worth to mention that these operations can also be executed in parallel.
Sampling
For sampling discrete Gaussian distributed integers in the key generation step we used the inversion transform method rather than rejection sampling because the number of stored entries is small and can be deleted afterwards. This improves the running times of the sampling step significantly. In particular, suppose the underlying parameter is denoted by s. We precompute a table of cumulative probabilties p t from the discrete Gaussian distribution with t ∈ Z in the range [−ω(
We then choose a uniformly random x ∈ [0, 1) and find t such that x ∈ [p t−1 , p t ]. This can be done using binary search. The same method is applied when sampling preimages from the set Λ ⊥ u (G) with parameter r. This parameter is always fixed and relatively small. Storing this table takes about 150 Bytes of memory. In this case signature generation is much faster than with simple rejection sampling. But, unfortunately, this does not apply in the randomized rounding step because the center always changes and thus involves a costly recomputation of tables after each sample. Therefore we used rejection sampling from [GPV08] instead. As for sampling continuous Gaussians with parameter t = 1, we used the Ziggurat algorithm [MT84] which is one of the fastest algorithms to produce continuous Gaussians. It belongs to the class of rejection sampling algorithms and uses precomputed tables.
Random Oracle Instantiation
For the GPV Signature scheme a Random Oracle H(·) is required which on an input message x outputs a uniformly random response H(x) from its image space. In most practical applications this is achieved by a cryptographic hash function together with a pseudorandom generator which provides additional random strings in order to extend the output length. In our implementation we used SHA256 together with the GMSS-PRNG [BDK + 07] because strings of arbitrary size are mapped to vectors from Z n q . Each component of the vector has at most log q bits.
The first Seed in is the input message, and the function is repeated until enough random output Rand is generated.
We implemented the GPV signature scheme, the trapdoor generation and sampling algorithms in C using the Fast Library for Number Theory (FLINT 2.3) and the GNU Scientific Library (GSL 1.15). FLINT comprises different data types for matrices and vectors operating in residue classes such as Z q and Z q [X] wheras the GSL library provides a huge variety of mathematical tools from linear algebra, that can be applied on different primitive data types. We also included the Automatically Tuned Linear Algebra Software Library (ATLAS) which is an empirical tuning system that creates an individual BLAS (Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms) library on the target platform on which the library is installed on. Specifically, this library provides optimized BLAS routines which have a significant impact on the running times of the used mathematical operations in the key and signature generation steps. So it is always recommended to include this library whenever one has to work with GSL. For the representation of matrices in Z n×m q FLINT provides the data structure nmod mat t which comes into use in our implementation of the matrix version. Regarding the ring version, working with polynomials is performed by using the data structure nmod poly t. FLINT makes use of a highly optimised Fast Fourier Transform routine for polynomial multiplication and some integer multiplication operations.
Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results and compare the matrix version with the ring variant (Construction 1). We provide running times and file sizes of keys and signatures. The experiments were performed on a Sun XFire 4400 server with 16 Quad-Core AMD Opteron(tm) Processor 8356 CPUs running at 2.3GHz, having 64GB of memory and running 64bit Debian 6.0.6. We used only one core in our experiments. To determine the file sizes of the private keys and signatures with entries coming from a vector with bounded length we need Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let v ∈ Z n be a vector with v 2 < b · √ n. Then the maximal bit size needed to store this vector is bounded by n · (1 + log 2 (b) ).
Proof. Let v ∈ Z n be a vector with
Since log is monotone increasing, maximizing of log is equivalent to maximizing the product. By
Lagrange we can define a function
We then maximize the function f (v 1 , . . . , v n , λ) = v 1 · . . . · v n + G(λ). Taking the partiell derivatives we get n + 1 equations :
By reordering of the first n equations, we get λ = v1·...·vi−1·vi+1·...·vn 2vi
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to see that the only solution is v i = b, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n that satisfies all equations (proof by contradiction). Therefore the maximal possible bit size required to store such a vector is bounded by n · log 2 (b) . We need an additional bit for the sign of each entry. This concludes the proof. The proof can be extended to any p-norm 1 ≤ p < ∞.
Below we provide two tables comparing the ring variant with the matrix variant. They contain the filesizes of the private key, public key, perturbation matrix and the signature (Table 2 right) as well as the running times of key generation, signature generation and verification (Table 2 left ). The last line of the table reflects the improvement induced by the modification of the parity check matrix A and hence the covariance matrix. The improvement factor is related to the optimized Cholesky decomposition (variant 1) which makes use of the sparsity of Σ p . Indeed, the improvement factor is much higher when comparing to the original Cholesky decomposition. The impact of the discrete Gaussian samplers and the ATLAS library used in our implementation are notably but not addressed in this work. Table 2 . Runtimes for key generation, signing and verification as well as file sizes of the public and private keys, of a signature and the perturbation matrix. All timings are in milliseconds, all sizes are in kilobytes. By ↑ we mean that the factor grows as n increases.
By the modification we obtain a key generation engine that is about 30-190 times faster in the ring variant. For n = 512 and n = 1024 signature generation is about 3 and respectively 6 times faster. It is also worth to mention that the authors of [MP12] explain the possibility of splitting the signing algorithm into an offline and online phase. The task of generating pertubations is independent from the message to be signed, hence it is possible to generate them in advance or create many samples and store them. This obviuosly requires to periodically create the perturbation matrix or storing it. From a practical point of view we do not consider such a breakdown in our implementations. But indeed, generating perturbations amounts after the optimizations to 60 percent of the running time in the ring variant and 13-30 percent in the matrix variant.
